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1. INTRODUCTION1
The pace of international economic activity and the developing
inter-dependence of national economies is head spinning. Govern-
ments find it increasingly difficult to implement worthy policies
concerning economic activity because such activity often crosses
borders in ways to escape the reach of much national government
control. This can be true for subjects as diverse as insurance,
brokerage, product health and safety standards, environmental
protection, banking, securities and investment, professional
services such as medical or law, and many more.
On the occasion of the new direction and title for this distin-
guished journal, it is appropriate to provide some reflections and
perceptions concerning the general domain, objects, and purposes
of "international economic law," with which I have been associ-
ated as a scholar and teacher for many years.
First, I will make some general observations about internation-
al economic law and its characteristics. Second, I will briefly
reflect on developments in the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Third, I will suggest
some broader implications of the Uruguay Round and other
activities of international economic law, namely the problems
posed today for government regulation of international economic
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behavior. Finally, I will offer a few conclusions.
2. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
At the outset, it is appropriate to ask what we mean by
"international economic law." This phrase can cover a very broad
inventory of subjects: embracing the law of economic transac-
tions, government regulation of economic matters, and related
legal relations including litigation and international institutions for
economic relations. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that ninety
percent of international law work is in reality international
economic law in some form or another. Much of this work, of
course, does not have the glamour or visibility of nation-state
relations (use of force, human rights, intervention, etc.), but it
does indeed involve many questions of international law, and
particularly treaty law. Increasingly, today's international
economic law issues are found on the front pages of the daily
newspapers.
A major problem for the legal scholar is the choice of subjects
for research and the approach to that research. I will reveal some
of my predilections. These preferences are to shape research so as
to be useful for the "active users," the legal professionals (govern-
ment or private) who must regularly cope with international law
concepts and legal rules. This is a "policy research" preference
rather than a "theory" preference, although obviously there are
many situations in which theory has important relevance to
policy. But such theory needs to be "good theory," and generally
I feel good theory must be tested, most often by empirical
observation. Thus, there is a strong component of empiricism in
my preferences.
In trying to describe international economic law, I would like
to mention four characteristics about the subject. First, interna-
tional economic law can not be separated or compartmentalized
from general or "public" international law. The activities and
cases relating to international economic law contain much practice
which is relevant to general principles of international law, espe-
cially concerning treaty law and practice. Conversely, general
international law has considerable relevance to economic relations
and transactions. It is interesting, for example, to compare the
number of cases handled by the GATT dispute settlement system
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(approximately 250)2 to those handled by the World Court
(approaching 100). Numbers do not tell the whole tale, but there
certainly are some GATT cases that have had as profound conse-
quences on national governments and world affairs as have
International Court of Justice cases. The GATT cases are rich
with practice relating to the general question of international
dispute resolution, and some of this practice has broader implica-
tions than simply for the GATT (and now its successor, the
World Trade Organization ("WTO")) system itself.
Second, the relationship of international economic law to
national or "municipal" law is particularly important. It is an
important part of understanding international law generally, but
this "link," and the interconnections between international
economic law and municipal law are particularly significant to the
operation and effectiveness of international economic law rules.
For example, an important question is the relationship of treaty
norms to municipal law, expressed by such phrases as "self
executing" or "direct application."3
Third, as the title phrase - international economic law -
suggests, there is necessarily a strong component of
multi-disciplinary research and thinking required for those who
work on international economic law projects. Of course,
"economics" is important and useful, especially for understanding
the policy motivations of many of the international and national
rules on the subject. Obviously, it is just as important to under-
stand some of the criticisms of economic analysis, and to treat
with skepticism some of the economic "models." Likewise, there
are alternative value structures which should balance some
economic notions of "efficiency." Thus, various lifestyle choices
and certain long-range value objectives can at least appear, and
perhaps actually be, contradictory to some economic objectives,
at least as some of those economic objectives are phrased by
certain writers.
In addition to economics, of course, other subjects are highly
relevant. Political science (and its intersection with economics
2 See ROBERT E. HuDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 417-585 (1993) (indexing
207 GATT complaints from July 1948 to November 1989).
' See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 310 (1993) (examining policy issues
concerning the relationship between international treaties and domestic law).
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found generally in the "public choice" literature) is very impor-
tant, as are many other disciplines, such as cultural history and
anthropology, geography, etc.
Last, as previously noted, work on international economic law
matters often seems to necessitate more empirical study than some
other international law subjects. Empirical research, however,
does not necessarily mean statistical research in the sense used in
many policy explorations. For some key issues of international
law, there are too few "cases" on which to base statistical conclu-
sions (such as correlations), so we are constrained to use a more
"anecdotal" or case study approach. This type of empiricism,
however, is nevertheless very important, and a good check on
theory or on sweeping generalizations of any kind.
Since this analysis often requires a study of particular cases, or
at least of certain groups of cases, with considerable quantitative
elements, it is frequently necessary to master a considerable
amount of detail to understand some of the interplay of forces
affecting international economic relations and the law concerning
those relations. What does all this imply for research? As many
of us represented in this volume realize already, our task in
selecting priorities for research and successfully carrying out such
research is not easy. Empiricism, multi-disciplinary approaches,
and the breadth of legal understanding to relate not only general
international law principles with international economic law, but
also both with national constitutional and other law, create quite
a burden.
Some of these points remind me of an experience I had
recently which I will share with you. About a year or two ago,
I received a call from a journalist editorial writer of one of the
major U.S. national papers. He had been trying to understand
something about dumping cases which were prominently in the
news, and he had been referred to me by a mutual friend. We
talked on the telephone for more than an hour about the essential
attributes of the international dumping rules, as well as the way
in which the United States applies those rules in its national law.
We worked through some hypothetical cases illustrating the
difficulties and the "tilts" in the rules and their administration. As
any of you who have had to grapple with this subject know, this
comes fairly quickly to the "mego" ("my eyes glaze over") stage.
My caller gallantly mastered the logic, however, and finally at the
end he said, "Boy, this certainly is the boiler room of internation-
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al relations!"
3. URUGUAY ROUND DEVELOPMENTS: AN EXAMPLE OF
RESEARCH NEEDS
At this time shortly after the completion of the GATT
Uruguay Round negotiation, it almost is unthinkable to write
about the subject of this paper without some reference to that
round and to what it means for this subject.4 I, for one, have
been greatly impressed with the achievements made in the
Uruguay Round. We are all aware of the difficulties encountered
in this Round which caused a prolongation of the negotiation.
I will not here go through an inventory of each of the many
Uruguay Round achievements.5  We are all familiar with the
importance of incorporating into the trading system the subjects
of trade in services, as well as intellectual property protection.
Likewise, we know the difficulties of bringing GATT discipline
to agriculture, and we admire that at least a start has been made
in that respect. Other achievements include significant market
access with impressive tariff cutting, a start towards remedying
problems in the textile trade, a more complete integration of
developing countries into the rule-oriented system, and new
"codes" for subsidies, safeguards, and product standards.
Perhaps the most significant achievement, however, at least
from the point of view of this group, is the result of the Uruguay
Round concerning institutions. Not only has an impressive new
set of dispute settlement procedures been put forward, but a new
charter for an international organization, the WTO, has been
approved as a sort of "capstone" for the many complicated
' Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, Morocco, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140. The
interested reader may also be interested in the following recent works by this
author: John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation
or Cautious Small Step Forward?, in THE WORLD ECONOMY 11-31 (1995); John
H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round, World Trade Organization, and the
Problems of Regulating International Economic Behavior, Hyman Soloway
Lecture, in POLcY DEBATES/DEBATS POLITIQUES (Centre for Trade Policy
and Law ed., 1995).
s See John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The World Trade
Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in MANAGING THE
WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 131, 131-52 (Peter
B. Kenen & Institute for International Economics eds., 1994).
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provisions of the negotiation results.
GATT, the previous institutional structure, was frail and beset
by what I have often called "birth defects." We recall that the
GATT was never intended to be an organization, but evolved into
one because of the failure, shortly after 1948, of nations to ratify
and put into effect the then drafted charter for an international
trade organization." As the defects and weaknesses of the GATT
institutional structure became more apparent, just during a period
of time when the problems of international economic relations
became more aggravated, it was clear to world leaders that an
improvement was needed in the institutional structure, and I
believe the WTO Charter represents such improvement.
The new WTO Charter is not perfect by any means and
certainly is not an international trade organization. The new
charter is more a "mini-charter," which is designed to carry
forward the practices and customary procedures that have been
,developed through trial and error within the GATT system for
more than forty years. Indeed, in many ways the new charter
better protects the institutional structure and the sovereignty of
the members than did the GATT structure with its defects. Many
practices which under GATT were merely customary, such as the
"consensus" technique of decisionmaking, have now been partially
defined and embodied in treaty language, with fall-back procedures
that will help protect against misuse of power or institutions. The
WTO will facilitate implementation of the Uruguay Round by
extending an institutional umbrella to the new subjects, and by
reinforcing the "single package idea" of the Uruguay Round. All
the principal treaty agreement clauses will now become required
for each WTO member, unlike the results of the Tokyo Round,
where nations could more or less pick and choose among ten or
so "side agreements."
The new dispute settlement procedures for the first time will
6 The World Trade Organization and US. Sovereignty: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 1994) (statement
of John H. Jackson).
7 See JOHN H. JACKSON, TiE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1-24 (1989)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] (examining international
economic regulations); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT
SYSTEM 45-87 (1990) (examining perspectives on international economic
institutions). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT (1969).
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establish a unified set of procedures for disputes of all types under
the various WTO agreements, and will embody these procedures
for the first time in a legal text, as compared to the rather impre-
cise views about customary practice that tended to prevail before.
If the new procedures work, certain specific defects of the system,
such as the blocking of panel reports, will be overcome, substitut-
ing instead an ingenious appellate procedure almost unique in
international law.
I think it is difficult to overemphasize the potential signifi-
cance of these achievements. The Uruguay Round itself has been
the most ambitious of the trade rounds under GATT, and would
be a success with half of its achievements. When you add to this
success a number of other current developments, including the
deepening and broadening of the European Union, the implemen-
tation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), and the developments of the economies "in
transition," such as parts of the former Soviet Union and of
mainland China, I think it is plausible that we are witnessing a
watershed shift and the most profound change in international
economic relations, institutions, and structures since the origin of
the Bretton Woods System at the end of World War II.
What the WTO will face in the future is still not clear. High
on the priority list of many persons' agendas is a thorough
consideration of the policies of environmental protection as they
relate to international trade." Additionally, considerable work on
the relationship of competition or antitrust policy and trade rules
is suggested. Embedded in the Uruguay Round results is a very
extensive work agenda, because many of the agreements call for
follow-up activity on, for example, services, agriculture, subsidies,
and intellectual property. Perhaps further down the road there
will be demands on the WTO system to consider the relationship
of other important subjects to the world trade rules, including
labor standards, human rights, and other "link" issues now
forming an important part of the trade questions. Further study
on some of the goals and assumptions of trade economics will un-
doubtedly be undertaken, and a number of issues we might call
' North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17. 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605.
9 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269, 1272-78 (1992).
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"cultural clash issues" will be given attention, including internal
economic structures of distribution and retail trade, gender
equality and other questions of discrimination, and the relation-
ship of political structures and democracy to successful long-term
trading relationships.
4. SOVEREIGNTY, SUBSIDIARITY, AND SOCIETY, OR
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATING INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
I would like now to turn to some tentative and more funda-
mental thinking about our subject. To some extent, I am trying
to anticipate what may be important directions for scholars and
thinkers relating to international economic law in the future.10
I start with the observable circumstances of a world that is
becoming increasingly intertwined and interdependent. Some call
this "globalization," and the manifestations are many. As you
look at some of the major developments during the last few years,
including the completion of NAFTA, the Uruguay Round
completion itself, the intricate and remarkably detailed bilateral
negotiations between the United States and Japan (some in the
context of the Structural Impediments Initiative ("SIl"), the direc-
tions of the European Union towards greater integration in
Europe, and the remarkable developments of the economies in
transition, including Russia and former parts of the Soviet Union,
China, and indeed many developing countries), we can see many
manifestations of this greater "globalization." If you examine in
particular some of the language in NAFTA, such as that language
in Chapter 11 or Chapter 18, it is truly astonishing how deeply
the treaty norms "intrude" into what has previously been termed
"sovereign prerogative."
The deepening regulation in Europe confirms that trend, and
to a somewhat lesser extent, but nevertheless on a much broader
scale, some of the Uruguay Round achievements (particularly the
potential of the services agreement and the intellectual property
agreement) point to a similar direction.
These efforts respond to a major problem of today's interna-
tional relations, namely, the difficulty of government regulation
10 John H. Jackson, Alternative Approaches for Implementing Competition
Rules in International Economic Relations, AUSSENWIRTsCHAFT-SWISS REV.
INT'L EcoN. REL. No. 2/94 177-200 (1994).
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of international economic behavior. Whether it is a banking
scandal such as BCCI, or the difficulty of harmonizing certain
consumer or food product standards, or the differential effects of
taxes, social security, medical insurance, and labor immobility,
there is today hardly any subject that can be said to be effectively
controlled by a single national sovereign. This issue, of course, is
frustrating to many national government leaders, since in many
circumstances it prevents them from effectively fulfilling their
constituents' needs or desires. Sometimes an attempt to "go it
alone" can simply generate counter-responses from other coun-
tries, such as escalating tariffs, competitive devaluation of curren-
cies, a "race to the bottom" in connection with regulatory
standards or taxation, and other difficulties. Many economists
analyze these problems as the "prisoner's dilemma" which, when
analyzed under game theory techniques, suggests the need for
international cooperation.
In these circumstances, governments often find (as they do
internally) that various worthy policies are conflicting. Trade
liberalization policies are designed to promote enhancement of
world welfare and to preserve the peace against rancorous
economic quarreling. Often, however, these policies appear to
conflict with environmental goals, human rights norms, and labor
standards. When these "dilemmas" of policy conflict occur within
a nation-state, they must be ironed out through the governmental
institutions of that nation. When these similar conflicts occur on
an international scale, then we must look to international
institutions for this task. Unfortunately, the international institu-
tions are notably weaker than most national institutions. Clearly,
then, there is an important field of policy research and endeavor
for scholars in exploring the techniques, mechanisms, and institu-
tions for providing the necessary international cooperation.
5. CONCLUSION
I think you can now see some of the directions my thinking
takes us. Legal scholars as well as economists and political
scientists must struggle with these problems using different types
of governmental activity: unilateral, bilateral, regional, or
multilateral. They must try to appraise the longer-term effective-
ness of these various levels of activity, and they must try to assist
policy makers in determining appropriate courses of action. The
legal scholar, however, has a particular, and I would say more
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important role. In a broad sense what we are struggling with is
the development of the "constitutional law" of international
economic relations. By this I refer to the international economic
or trade system as a whole, and the institutional structures which
allow it to operate effectively. Thus, we face issues for which the
lawyer's role is, at least partly, to help protect the longer-range
constitutional provisions from certain short-term or ad hoc
expediency temptations of governments or other players in that
system, and to help shape the direction of that constitutional
development.
Very important to this "constitutional" approach is the
question of appropriate allocation of power and the protection
against the misuse of power. The needs for international
cooperation lead to the development of international organiza-
tions, but such organizations can be misused and their power
abused. For example, leadership of an organization can be
unresponsive and relatively self-perpetuating (given the diplomatic
difficulties of selection of leaders in the context of more than one
hundred nations participating). Such leaders, or power structures
within organizations, can cause a misallocation of the resources of
the organization (such as for a marble headquarters, or an
inappropriately high percentage of expenditures for low priority
activity). There have even been some occasional allegations of
fraudulent activity. Furthermore, some countries which are heavy
contributors resent being outvoted by large numbers of mini-states
which are arguably irresponsible because the projects the latter
favor do not require any contribution by them.
This also brings us to the question of sovereignty and
subsidiarity. In some peoples' eyes, sovereignty is an outdated
idea. Insofar as sovereignty implies the right of governments to
do what they will, including torture their own citizens, I believe
most people would recognize that the ancient concepts are no
longer viable today. In addition, the actual circumstances of the
"globalized market" impose realistic constraints on the unilateral
exercise of "sovereignty" to solve certain problems. Some would
argue that we should virtually do away with the concept of
sovereignty. On the other hand, there may be a newer approach
to defining sovereignty that could be significant and worthwhile.
This would embrace the idea that the concept of national
sovereignty is really part of "subsidiarity" (a term often discussed
in Europe), meaning that sovereignty in this sense is a claim that
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the appropriate allocation of power among different levels of
government leads to a conclusion that certain types of decisions
should be made only at the national level and not in an interna-
tional organization or cooperative mechanism. The concept of
subsidiarity, however, could go further. It could lead to a conclu-
sion that other kinds of decisions must be elevated to the
international level. In addition, it could lead to the conclusion that
sub-national, regional or even cultural units should be endowed
with the exclusive power to make certain kinds of decisions.
These are matters of considerable importance
which legal scholars should address.
Connected with these issues are dozens of more detailed legal
issues regarding the structure of a charter for an international
organization and the procedures for various kinds of decision
making. These include whether voting should be by majority or
a super-majority, whether there should be "veto rights," whether
voting should be weighted, and whether there should be some
small "steering group" power centers.
In addition, an increasingly important issue for these constitu-
tional problems of "international governance," is the
dispute-settlement procedures and mechanisms associated with
them. Particularly with reference to international economic
relations, I have argued elsewhere that a "rule-oriented" approach
is very significant." Such an approach gives additional predict-
ability and stability such that millions of individual entrepreneurs
and investors will have a higher degree of confidence in the
decisions which they make. This can lower transaction costs,
lower certain risk premiums that might otherwise apply, and thus
better allocate investment or market decisions so as to enhance
world welfare. These rules and their evolution can also be a
major mechanism for mediation between conflicting policy goals
of the international economic system.
There are certainly many other institutional and "constitution-
al" issues that can also be addressed by international economic law
scholars, including some of the detailed questions involving
secretariats, privileges and immunities, budget making, the role of
officials in organizations, and the activity of such officials, such as
mediation and good offices. The relationship of trade institutions
to the monetary organizations and the Bretton Woods System
" See JAcKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 85-88.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
clearly needs more attention.
To close, perhaps one could characterize these views as part of
a "pragmatist school" of international law scholarship 12 or maybe
a "normative realist" school, to signal less resignation to the "way
things are." Many scholars feel the pressure of responsibility for
moving the subject forward despite the difficulty and limitation
of resources, and despite the sometimes pessimistic viewpoint that
mere "realism" can engender. This journal, with its new title and
focus, will clearly make an important contribution to these goals
in collaboration with those scholars.
12 See David Kennedy, The International Style in Post-War Law and Policy,
7 UTAH L. REV. 6 (1994), reprinted in 10 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 671 (1994).
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